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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOHN A BECK, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
-v-
) 
S. TONY COX, Director, ) 
~rivers License Division, ) 
Dept. of Public Safety, ) 
State of Utah, ) 
Defendant 
and Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
Case No. 15795 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order of the Third Judie-
ial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah the HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, Judge, presiding. As a 
result of a trial de novo held on March 7, 1978, the Trial 
Court found that the Appellant unreasonably refused to 
submit to a chemical test pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as amended. (Record, 23-24). 
The case was heard by the Court without a jury. 
The issue on appeal seems to involve the legal 
interpretation of Section 41-6-44.10, as amended by the 
1977 Utah State Legislature. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOl'lER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court after a non-
jury trial entered an Order upholding the decision of the 
Drivers License Division that Appellant refused to submit 
to a chemical test, resulting in a revocation of his 
driver's license. The trial de novo was held pursuant 
to Section 41-5-41.10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), as 
amended. 
NATURE OF RP.LILF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks an affirmation of the Third 
Judicial District Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 8, 1977, John Beck and his wife were 
at Little America Restaurant for the purpose of having 
dinner. (Record, 31). They discovered that they had left 
their checkbook at the motel where they were staying on 
North West Temple. Appellant left his wife at the rest-
aurant and went to get the checkbook. (Record, 32). 
At approximately the intersection of Second South 
and Third West, Salt Lake City, Utah, he was pulled over 
by police officers. (Record, 32, 46-67). Officer Mark, 
the arresting officer, observed the automobile making a 
right hand turn, swerve in a jerky fashion and did not 
return to the right hand lane of traffic, but straddle a 
-2- I 
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white lane-dividing line. (Record, 46-47). He also 
testified that he had to hold the door of his car, 
apparently for support, and also that he smelled an odor 
of alcohol from the Appellant's person. (Record, 53). 
Field sobriety tests were administered. The tesi-
mony was that the heel to toe test was not performed as 
requested. (Record, 48). After observing Mr. Beck and 
his performance of all of the field sobriety tests, Officer 
Mark formed his opinion that Mr. Beck had been driving 
under the influence of alcohol. (Record, 54). Officer 
l~rk then arrested Mr. Beck for driving under the influence 
of intoxicants. (Record, 54). 
Officer Mark read verbatim from his card one time 
explaining the Utah Implied Consent Law and on two other 
occassions explained it to Mr. Beck. (Record, 54). Each 
of the three times testified to Mr. Beck was warned of 
the consequences of a refusal. (Record, 55). Mr. Beck 
was requested to submit to a chemical test on three dif-
ferent occassions before he and Officer Mark arrived at 
the jail and once while at the jail. (Record, 50). 
Mr. Beck responded, "I don't know" when asked the first 
two times and refused to answer the third and fourth 
requests. (Record, 50). Mr. Beck at no time requested 
the test. (Record, 55). 
-3- J 
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At the jail, the officer asked the Appellant to 
take a chemical test for the fourth time, and filled out 
the refusal form. (Record, 50-52). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSES AND REFUSALS TO 
ANSWER WHEN REQUESTED TO SUBMIT TO A 
CHEMICAL TEST CONSTITUTED A REFUSAL 
UNDER THE IMPLIED CONSENT LAW 
"Actions" or "inaction" and/or "spoken words" or 
"muteness" under the circumstances can constitute a refusal 
to submit to a chemical test. To hold otherwise would 
mean that all unsafe motorists could escape the consequences 
of the civil implied consent lawby merely refusing to 
speak and/or act. 
Lampman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal. 
App. 3d 922, 105 Cal. Rptr. 101, is almost directly on 
point with this case. In Lampman, the officer explained 
the implied consent law to the motorist and requ-ested her 
on four different occassions to submit to a chemical test. 
Each time she remained mute and failed to respond in any 
way to the requests. The test was never "physically" 
offered. The Court, after quoting a case where the motorist 
replied "I'm not even going to give you an answer" held 
that the motorists silence after the four requests 
-4-
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indicated the same and constituted a refusal. In 
answering the motorist's contention that the officer should 
have attempted to administer the test in order to find 
out if her silence meant refusal in fact, the Court 
declared, "we discern no substance to this phantom 
suggestion" and went on to explain why. 
In McKenzie v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 37 Ohio 
Misc. 24, 306 N.E. 2d 197, the Court held that the 
motorist's muteness when requested to submit to a chemical 
test constituted a refusal. The Court also held that 
lack of intelligence or language skill was no defense. 
See also State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Riha, 
10 Wash. App. 857, 520 P. 2d 942, where the Court held 
that the motorist's silence, under the circumstances, 
constituted a refusal. 
Appellant cites Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P. 2d 451 
(Utah 1976), (under the old statute), asserting that 
a refusal must be express. In Hyde, the arrest took 
place at 9:45 a.m. and the alleged refusal at 9:50 a.m. 
After noting that plaintiff was extremely upset and that 
"probable cause" for the arrest was awfully suspect, the 
Court stated that "under the circumstances here, four or 
five minutes is not a reasonable time within which to 
expect a sentient consent or refusal." This case is 
clearly distinguishable on its facts. In the case at 
bar, the officer and Appellant were together thirty to 
-5-
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forty minutes, certainly a reasonable length of time 
within which to make a decision to submit or not. (Record, 
55). 
This Court,along with every other Court who has 
considered the question of what constitutes a refusal, has 
acknowledged the obvious and practical reality that a 
refusal need not be in words. The officer, and the Trial 
Court reasonably interpreted the silence (subsequent to 
words showing he was listening) to be an express refusal 
just as if Appellant had said "no". 
Appellant cites Mills v. Swanson, 93 Idaho 279, 
460 P. 2d 704, for the proposition that silence is 
insufficient to constitute a refusal. That Court held 
silence to be insufficient on the facts since the motorist 
was bleeding, had lost some teeth, sustained head injuries 
and a fractured periosteum, and the arresting officer 
admitted that the motorist could have been dazed. These 
facts are clearly distinguishable from those in the case at r' 
POP~'!' II 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED MISCONCEPTIONS WERE 
NOT INDUCED BY THE OFFICER NOR WERE THEY 
MADE KNOWN TO HIM; THEREFORE, THOSE 
ALLEGED MISCONCEPTIONS CANNOT BE A DEFENSE 
Elliot v. Dorius, 557 P. 2d 759 (Utah 1976), and 
Gassman v. Darius, 543 P. 2d 197 (Utah 1975), cited by 
Appellant, do not stand for the proposition that the 
-6-
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"secret" intentions or misconceptions of the motorist 
are to be considered on the issue of "refusal". Elliot 
held that plaintiff's demand for a blood test, after 
being informed that it was not available locally, consti-
tuted a refusal and further held that a contemporaneous 
advising of rights, designation of test, and refusal 
sufficiently complied with statutory requirements. In 
Gassman, this Court affirmed the Trial Court's finding 
that the arresting officer and the motorist had agreed 
to the taking of a blood test and that the officer refused 
thereafter to participate pursuant to their agreement. 
While these two cases look objectively to the facts and 
circumstances to see if the refusal was reasonable or 
not, they do not stand for the proposition that the 
subjective and secret thoughts of the appellant are to 
be considered. 
The main requirements of the officer under the 
Utah Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10, 
(1953), as amended, are that he request the motorist to 
submit to a chemical test and that he explain the consequences 
of a refusal. No other explanations are required by the 
law. 
Case law seems unanimous in holding that misunder-
standings or misconceptions on the motorist's part are 
no defense to a refusal unless the officer has created 
them. Any confusion or misconception must be objecitvely 
-7-
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manifested to the officer and he should, ~nd could then 
attempt to dispel it. Absent this "objective confusion" 
the officer has no affirmative duty to explain further, 
for obvious reasons. 
In Jones v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. 
App. 3d 615, 139 Cal. Rptr. 734, an out-at-state motorist 
claimed that California's implied consent law is confusing 
per se to an out-of-state driver and that his miscon-
ception about an out-of-state exemption was honest and 
reasonable and could be a defense. The Court held that 
the California law was not confusing per se to an out-
of-stater. The Court further held that since the officer 
had not induced the misconception nor was the misconception 
objectively manifested to the officer, the second defense 
was also meritless. 
The Court in Hatten v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 
15 Wash. App. 656, 551 P. 2d 145, quoted itself while 
speaking to defense of "confusion on the motorist's part". 
When a driver clearly exhibits 
that he is confused or does ~ot under-
stand the information directed by RCW 
46.20.308 to be given him by the officer, 
then the officer is required to further 
clarify the driver's alternative and 
the consequences of electing one or 
the other. Under these circumstances, 
when clairfication is not provided, 
the license of the driver may not be 
revoked on the ground that he refused 
the breathalyzer test. The burden 
of showing that he made his confusion 
apparent to the officer and was denied 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
further clarification is upon the 
driver who proposes such a defense. 
When such a defense is presented, a 
finding as to whether or not the 
defendant explicitly exhibited his 
lack of understanding and was denied 
clarification must be entered. 
(Emphasis added) . 
For other cases holding that "silent" misunderstandings 
I 
or misconceptions are not a valid defense to a refusal 
see Lampman, supra; Massaro v. Dolan, 535 P. 2d 1135 
(Colo Ct. App. 1975); McKenzie, supra; Shoemaker v. State, 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 l\lash. App. 860, 526 P. 2d 
908; Department of Motor Vehicles v. Riba, supra. 
In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever 
indicating either that the officer mislead Appellant or 
that the alleged "misconceptions" on Appellant's part 
were objectively manifested to the officer. The fact 
that Appellant's alleged misconceptions may have been 
manifested to one other than the officer, after the 
officer considered the silence to be a refusal, is 
irrelevant and inconsequential insofar as the refusal 
is concerned. 
The case law above holds that the burden is on 
Appellant to establish that he manifested his miscon-
ceptions to the officer. The officer was not required 
to explain the "niceties" of the law or the procedures 
to be followed unless questioned. A motorist has no 
-9-
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right to "silently" speculate as to when and where the 
test is to be administered, when the last point in time 
to submit is, how one refuses, etc. The law and policy 
cannot tolerate such conduct. 
As indicated earlier, the law is not confusing 
per se and an out-of-state motorist cannot rely on the 
law of his home state but must be deemed to know the law 
of the jurisdiction he chooses to enter. The cases 
seem to hold that a motorist who has a misconception 
or who is "not sure" about law or procedure has the 
burden of inquiring and cannot just sit back and refuse 
to respond or inquire. 
Appellant cites both Calvert v. State Department 
of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo. 
1974) and West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, App. 80 
Cal. Rptr. 385, to support his argument that a misunder-
standing can invalidate a refusal. Both cases are easily 
distinguishable since Calvert involved officer-induced 
confusion and West involved an objectively manifested 
confusion that the officer fai~ed to dispel. 
POINT III 
THE ISSUES INVOLVING "REFUSAL" AND 
"MISCONCEPTION" ARE QUESTIONS FOR THE 
TRIER OF FACT. THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED SINCE 
THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
' 
-10-
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The evidence adduced at trial is clearly sufficient 
to su~~ort the Trial Court's finding that Appellant 
refused to submit to a chemical test. 
Appellant had sufficient time to make a sentient 
decision to submit or not. (Record, 55). Officer Mark 
read verbatim his card explaining the implied consent law 
to Appellant and on two other occassions explained it to 
him. (Record, 54). Each time (three) Appellant was 
warned of the consequences of a refusal. (Record, 55). 
Appellant was requested to submit to a chemical test on 
three different occassions before he and the officer 
arrived at the jail and was then requested to submit once 
while at the jail. (Record, 50). Appellant responded, 
"I don't know" when asked the first two times and refused 
to answer when asked the third and fourth times. (Record, 
50). 
Appellant at no time requested the officer to 
give him a chemical test. (Record, 55). Officer Mark 
stayed at th~ jail long enough to request Appellant to 
submit to a test for the fourth time and to fill out the 
refusal form. (Record, 50-52). 
Both the officer and the Trial Court considered 
Appellant's refusal to respond to the officer's requests 
to be a refusal. Appellant was warned of the consequences 
three different times and failed to "immediately thereafter 
request the test", as required by the new statute. The 
-11-
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Trial Judge could properly find that the officer certainlz 
wasn't aware of Appellant's thoughts and intentions and 
could not be expected to do or say anything more than 
what he did. 
The issues of "refusal" and confusion" are to 
be looked at objectively from a reasonable person's 
point of view. They are questions of fact to be decided 
by the trier of fact. 
The Trail Judge is in a position to observe 
the testimony first hand, the demeanor of the witnesses, 
etc. He can get the most "accurate" and "just" feeling 
for the evidence. This Court in Gassman, supra, stated 
that, "Each case is based on its own facts, and we do not 
reverse the Trial Judge unless he clearly does violence 
to the facts as they relate to his findings." 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Campbell v. Superior 
~, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685, indicated how a non-
verbal refusal is to be ascertained. 
It is the opinion of this Court 
that a refusal to submit to the test 
occurs where the conduct of the arrested 
motorist is such that a reasonable 
person in the officer's position would 
be justified in believing that such 
motorist was capable of refusal and 
manifested an unwillingness to submit 
to the test. 
That Court recognized that the issue of "refusal" is 
for the trier of fact. State Department of Public 
-12-
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Safety v. Stravaas, 227 N.W. 2d 819 (Minn. 1975), stated 
that the ·issues surrounding an alleged "misconception" 
are for the trier of fact. For other cases holding that 
the "refusal" and "confusion" issues are for the trier 
of fact and should not easily be disturbed on appeal see 
Hatten, supra; Kauffman v. Motor Vehicle Division, 500 
P. 2d 473 (Or. App. 1972). 
The evidence establishing a refusal is substantial 
and certainly sufficient to support the Tr~al Court's 
decision. The record is devoid of any evidence supporting 
Appellant's defense of misunderstanding. The discussions 
Appellant had with "others" after the officer left are 
irrelevant. 
The finding of "refusal" should only be reversed 
if this Court decides as a matter of law that a refusal 
to speak or otherwise respond to a request to submit 
to a chemical test, under any circumstances, cannot consti-
tute a refusal. Such a legal conclusion would ignore 
reality and practicality in reasonably applying Utah's 
Implied Consent Law and would expose the public to greater 
danger on the highways. 
CONCLUSION 
Case law recognizes that a refusal to speak 
when requested to submit to a chemical test can constitute 
-13-
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a refusal just as if the motorist said "no". 
By his semi-muteness, when requested to submit 
to a chemical test, Appellant did expressly refuse. 
Under the facts of this case, the law does not 
recognize Appellant's alleged misconceptions, whether 
true in fact or not, as a defense to his refusal. 
The Trial Court's finding that Appellant refused 
to submit to a chemical test involves issues of fact, 
for the trier of fact, and should not be reversed as 
there is substantial evidence in the record supporting 
that finding. 
DATED this :27 !. day of July, 1978. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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